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In a context of lagging reform in the Bretton Woods institutions, China has brought 
the debate on its role as a rising power in global economic governance onto 
the front pages, notably with the divided response of ‘the West’ to membership 
in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which is to be headquartered 
in Beijing. This Policy Briefing argues that China’s rise as a development financer 
has reached the point where it now has basic interests and responsibilities in the 
systemic functioning of global development financing. Yet there is still a long way 
to go before Chinese policymakers see transparency of China’s development 
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 China’s Development Finance: 
 Ambition, Impact and 
Transparency
China’s development cooperation goes 
back to the 1955 Bandung Conference 
and earlier. The Bandung principles of 
mutual benefit, mutual learning and 
non-interference, were subsequently 
reflected in the eight principles of 
Chinese aid formulated in 1964 by former 
premier Zhou Enlai. This tradition remains 
an important part of China’s present day 
pragmatism in development cooperation. 
Over the past decade China has also 
grown to become the world’s major 
exporter of capital with an explicit ‘going 
out’ policy, providing signals and guidance 
to public and private Chinese enterprises 
and lenders active in both developed 
and developing markets. Its stake has 
risen decisively in the sustainability of the 
resource supply chains that it has built and 
in the sustained political and economic 
development of its partner countries. 
As a large exporter of capital, China 
has developed channels for providing 
finance on an active basis, including 
the diversification into real assets of 
accumulated foreign reserves, which 
are already several times larger than any 
safety net that China requires to keep 
its political and economic independence. 
Hence the emergence of Chinese 
financial centres and institutions with 
an international vocation. Beyond its 
fast-growing foreign aid programme, 
which will make it a top donor country 
in the foreseeable future, China has the 
sovereign-guaranteed Export-Import 
(Exim) Bank and the China Development 
Bank (CDB) as very major sources of 
development finance. The CDB also 
helps to fund Chinese foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in developing countries. 
Another channel for China’s capital 
exports is multilateral development 
finance. Here, China has previously kept 
a low profile, but its recent and dramatic 
set of initiatives to establish China-based 
institutions has now captured world 
attention. As a former aid recipient itself, 
China used multilateral and bilateral 
aid strategically and well. However, it 
has been critical of donor-driven policy 
prescriptions and aid conditionalities. 
To increase its say in the governance 
of the World Bank, China decided in 
2007 to become a new donor to the 
International Development Association, 
the World Bank’s aid arm. But gaining 
influence in US-dominated institutions 
has been slow, so China decided to 
set up new development finance 
institutions in which its priorities and 
policy approaches would have more 
impact. The world is now waiting to see 
how these new institutions, as well as 
China’s existing development finance 
institutions, its foreign aid programme 
and its enterprises, reflect a larger Chinese 
project for global development and how it 
will contribute to a global order of responsible 
lending and borrowing.
Against this background, this briefing examines 
three questions regarding China’s supply of 
finance to developing countries.
Ambition
On the basis of the achievements and 
challenges of the past three-and-a-half 
decades, China’s leaders have launched a 
major programme of domestic political, social, 
economic and ecological reform – in the 
words of Premier Li Keqiang during his Special 
Address at the World Economic Forum (WEF) 
Annual Meeting of the New Champions 2014, 
a ‘self-targeted revolution’ releasing the powers 
of mass entrepreneurship and innovation, with 
a view to becoming a moderately prosperous 
middle-income country by 2020, a stated 
aim of the Chinese Communist Party. At 
the same time, this reform programme is 
seen as the way forward to achieving the 
‘Chinese Dream’ of becoming a great nation 
in a cooperative global system underpinned 
by what has been presented as a new model 
of major country relations with the US to 
ensure that its emergence as a rising power 
will be peaceful. Although China, as a member 
of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa), has an expressed objective of 
progressing to a world order that reflects the 
emerging new balance of economic power, Mr 
Li affirmed at the WEF in 2015 that ‘the world 
order established after World War II must be 
maintained, not overturned’. 
Within this vision, China is indeed bringing 
bold new horizons and new ideas into the 
global development scene: 
• A new take on global economic geography 
– a vision of a new Silk Road reaching across 
Central Asia and the Middle East to Europe, 
or across the Indian Ocean to connect 
the Chinese Dream with the African 
Union’s ‘Vision 2063’, which envisages an 
‘integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, 
driven by its own citizens and representing a 
dynamic force in the global arena’.
• A new vision of how China will move its 
economy up the value chain, creating more 
opportunities for the world, including in 
low-income countries with rising labour 
supply where Chinese firms can apply their 
management and marketing expertise in 
labour-intensive industries. 
• A new readiness to work with others 
on these large agendas of global and local 
connectivity and development, as witnessed 
in the broad membership of the AIIB and the 
US$2bn Growing Together Fund established 
at the African Development Bank.
• New ideas of how mass entrepreneurship 
and innovation can be a way forward for 
development in China, and perhaps in other 
parts of the world. Mr Li has drawn these 
ideas from the work of US Nobel Prize 
winner, Edmund Phelps, embodied in a newly 
released, innovation-driven development 
strategy and the ‘Made in China 2025’ 
strategy. The vision here is that providing 
a nation of 1.5 billion people with the 
intellectual and economic space for dynamic 
market-driven innovation will change China 
and the world at the same time.
China’s political reform programme and 
its economic, social and environmental 
dimensions are currently the subject of intense 
debate inside and outside China. What cannot 
be doubted is that the Chinese Dream has 
profound implications globally in terms of its 
impact on development trajectories. 
Impact
China’s development impact so far is difficult 
to judge, with little hard data available. This 
is particularly the case for the bulk of the 
development finance provided by China, which is 
supplied at (Chinese) market terms by the Exim 
Bank and the CDB. Nevertheless, this finance 
clearly did much to underwrite the investment 
boom in resource-related ventures and 
infrastructure, integral to the commodities boom 
created by prolonged fast growth in China. 
These institutions also financed a wider range 
of transport, energy and telecommunications 
infrastructure in developing countries. The ‘Africa 
rising’ story has much to do with this supply 
of Chinese development finance, even if its 
magnitude has been overestimated. 
It is clear that China has ideas that go beyond the 
prevailing wisdom on aid programming among 
the countries of the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
though not so far from the ideas of Japan and 
Korea, with whom it shares the experience of 
being a ‘developmental state’ with a ‘learning by 
doing’ development model. Chinese development 
finance has been a major impulse behind the 
‘identity crisis’ among members of the OECD- 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 
propelling a tightening of concessionality rules 
for official development assistance flows 
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alongside an initiative to create a broad 
category of ‘total official support for 
sustainable development’. This broader category 
would bring recognition and transparency to 
flows from all providers of development 
finance, China prospectively included.
The relocation of labour-intensive Chinese 
industries to developing regions with large 
increases in labour supply would be financed 
essentially through Chinese FDI. In 2014, 
outflows of FDI from China exceeded inflows 
for the first time. Mr Li has announced an 
expectation for Chinese FDI stocks in Africa to 
rise from a current $25bn to $100bn by 2020. 
In the context of the Forum for China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC), China is providing 
$30bn of credit lines through the CDB, China 
Exim Bank and other commercial banks in the 
current three-year period (2013–15). When the 
next FOCAC meeting is held in South Africa 
in November 2015, this could rise to $50bn 
according to some reports. Yet how much of this 
financing actually gets drawn down is less clear.
The use of rising capital inflows to Africa 
requires active investment strategies and 
capacities on the part of African governments 
and their integration into forward-financing 
scenarios extending into the long term. The new 
World Bank-International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
debt sustainability framework looks at aggregate 
borrowing plans of developing countries on 
a 20-year time horizon. The Chinese position 
has been to ensure that the transformative 
impacts of large-scale infrastructure financing 
are factored into the assessment of debt 
sustainability. Both the former President of 
the China Exim Bank Li Ruogu and Jin Liqun, a 
potential president of the AIIB, have made the 
case that large-scale infrastructure transforms 
economic capacities in a way not captured by 
current debt sustainability calculations.
The principle of ‘non-interference’ is another 
area of difference where impact issues are in 
question. There are signs that this principle 
is being applied now with less tolerance 
for corruption and mismanagement of 
resources, and with more engagement of 
Chinese economic expertise. Large loans 
to Brazil and Venezuela were subject to 
extensive study by teams from the CDB, but 
are now embroiled in complex local political 
economy problems. And financial support to 
Zimbabwe is on hold, pending a programme 
of technical assistance from China’s National 
Development Reform Commission to develop 
financial management systems to stop 
‘leakages’ of public money, and to provide 
management expertise for the reform of 
Zimbabwe’s state-owned enterprises.
All the above suggests that China’s transition 
to the status of the world’s largest capital 
exporter, and its own internal political and 
economic reforms, are making developmental 
impact the major criterion in its development 
policies. There is here a basic point of 
convergence with ‘Western donors’. The 
BRICS New Development Bank will need to 
establish a reputation as a ‘good bank’ in terms 
of standards and stakeholder engagement if it 
is to underpin the objective of the BRICS to 
be a highly regarded part of global governance 
arrangements in a changing world. And for 
China, with the New Development Bank 
hosted in Shanghai, and the AIIB and Silk 
Road Fund in Beijing, the impact on China’s 
reputation as a centre of global finance and 
development thinking, along with China’s basic 
interest and role in sustainable development 
globally, will be powerful forces in the direction 
of convergence. Yet this does not necessarily 
mean that China will adopt the same standards 
or rules as OECD countries. China is dedicated 
to bringing its own perspectives to improving 
existing ideas and practices. 
Transparency 
In moving from the margins of development 
finance to being a central actor and 
provider, China now has basic interests and 
responsibilities in the systemic functioning of 
global development financing. This turning 
point is evidenced by systematic efforts made 
by the Ministry of Commerce to establish a 
comprehensive aid database and to develop 
evaluation tools for project management. 
Yet despite institutionalised endeavours to 
improve the internal auditing system of its aid 
programmes, Chinese policymakers are still 
ambivalent regarding how far China should go 
to disclose its development finance outflows 
and impacts as they ponder appropriate 
standards for aid data and evaluation methods. 
While keeping abreast of OECD-DAC practice, 
Chinese policymakers tend to believe that China 
should tailor existing international standards 
to its own concepts – for example, it should 
take account of mutual benefits in its data 
and evaluation standards, which is alien to the 
DAC’s North-South welfare/resource transfer 
concept. In the foreseeable future, the ‘most 
likely’ scenario is that China will neither join the 
DAC system to publicise its aid data in line with 
DAC standards, nor actively take a leadership 
Policy implications
In summary, below are core messages policymakers need to know to better engage 
with China as a rising development financer:
• Reflecting its status as the world’s largest exporter of capital – a status likely to 
persist even with growth at a ‘new normal’ and higher domestic consumption 
reducing the current account surplus – China’s emergence as the world’s largest 
supplier of finance to developing countries is associated with increased interests 
and responsibilities in global governance systems. The creation of new multilateral 
development banks to be located in Beijing and Shanghai brings new horizons 
and new thinking to an institutional landscape so far largely determined by the 
Bretton Woods institutions and Western concepts and intellectual centres. At 
the same time there will be strong ‘convergence’ factors as the new institutions 
seek to establish their reputation for promoting effective and sustainable 
development, while adding a strong ‘transformation’ and ‘speed’ thrust into the 
design and implementation of large infrastructure projects and environmentally 
sustainable green-growth programmes.
• China’s wide-ranging domestic reform programme, and its search to work with 
others to generate new global development dynamics in a sustained global order, 
implies greater transparency of data and impact than is currently envisaged in 
Beijing. China’s presidency of the G20 in 2016 may provide a context in which 
advances in these crucial areas may become politically feasible as they become 
functionally necessary.
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role in advancing distinctive standards for 
South-South development cooperation. 
In this ‘most likely’ scenario China will 
rather continue to strengthen the internal 
auditing system of its development finance 
outflows and gradually refine its existing 
standards for transparency and evaluation. 
Annual reports would provide a vehicle 
for publishing this material and shaping 
domestic public opinion on the growing 
scale of Chinese foreign aid.
Yet there are powerful forces within 
and beyond China that may bring rapid 
acceleration to this scenario. Transparency 
is now a key principle in China’s own 
domestic reform programme. And 
China’s move to create new international 
institutions and to work with others on 
ambitious new development investments 
carries the implication of transparency, 
synergy, and collective impact evaluation 
at the country and regional levels. 
Alongside these fundamental factors, 
independent endeavours to generate 
data on China’s development finance 
by mining news reports and satellite 
searches will create pressure to provide 
disaggregated official numbers. China has 
recently acceded to the IMF’s Special Data 
Dissemination Standard, which signals 
a readiness to enhance the availability 
of timely economic and financial data. 
And, with the US, it has entered into 
negotiations towards creating a new 
multilateral framework for export credit 
rules of the game. Meanwhile, China’s 
own development research community 
is making the case for active involvement 
in international development forums and 
for increased structure, transparency and 
evaluation in China’s foreign aid.
